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ADVISORY OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS
Phillip M. Kannan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1793, the affirmative grant of authority to federal
courts in Article III of the Constitution to hear and decide
cases or controversies1 has been interpreted to prohibit these
courts from giving advisory opinions. In that year, United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and
District Judge Duane rejected a provision in a 1792 act of Con-
gress that would have required the Supreme Court to settle
federal pension claims of widows and orphans subject to the
approval of the Secretary of War.' The basis for the position
taken by the Chief Justice was "that neither the legislative nor
the executive branches can constitutionally assign to the judi-
cial branch any duties but such as are properly judicial, to be
performed in a judicial manner."3 The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged this limitation on federal judicial power repeatedly
since that date in its decisions, including the recent case of
* B.S., 1961, University of North Carolina; MA., 1963, University of North Car-
olina; J.D. 1974, University of Tennessee. Member of the Tennessee Bar and corpo-
rate counsel. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
1. Article III, Section 2 states in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases af-
fecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the Unit-
ed States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;--between a State and Citizens of another Stat ;-between citizens
of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. See Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (1792); see also Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (discussing the statute).
3. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 346.
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Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,4 in which the Court
faulted the en banc Ninth Circuit Court for failing to recognize
"federal courts' lack of authority to act in friendly or feigned
proceedings."5 Yet, despite the universality and age of this fun-
damental principle of federal jurisprudence, federal courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, do not always honor it.
The statement that federal courts do not have the authority
to give advisory opinions is an over simplification of the rule as
it is actually applied by federal courts. There is, in fact, a three
part rule regarding advisory opinions. Two parts do indeed
foreclose federal courts to persons seeking advise,6 but one part
recognizes the usefulness of judicial advice and allows it to be
imbedded in decisions As the cases and discussion in Sections
IH-V of this article show, the determination of which branch of
the rule will be applied in a particular case is made through
the use of a balancing process in which the federal courts ulti-
mately retain the power to determine the policies that are
placed on the scales and the weight of each.
The basic hypothesis of this article is that federal courts
cannot be compelled, either by Congress or parties, to render
advisory opinions, but under circumstances they themselves
define, these courts may elect to give advice. Section II provides
a brief explanation of what is meant by the term "advisory
opinion," and its antithesis, case or controversy. Sections HI
and IV discuss the cases that establish the first part of this
hypothesis. Section V analyzes federal cases, that imbed advice
in the opinions. The goal of this latter analysis is to identify
the reasons that have motivated courts to give advice and
which reasons may prompt that result in future cases. Section
VI provides recommendations that may be helpful in striking a
balance between the constitutional theory of no advisory opin-
ions by federal courts and the practice of those courts of using
advisory opinions to better fulfill their constitutional role.
4. 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
5. Id. at 1070; see also Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997) ("Under
Article I, [section] 2 of the Constitution, the federal courts have jurisdiction over
this dispute . . . only if it is a 'case' or 'controversy.').
6. See infra Parts HI & IV.
7. See infra Part V.
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II. MEANING OF "ADVISORY OPINION"
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts are limit-
ed to deciding cases and controversies.' Therefore, if a federal
court purports to rule on an issue that is not a case or contro-
versy, it is performing a duty that is not "properly judicial,"9
and hence, its opinion would be merely advisory. Thus, the
meaning of advisory opinion can be understood by considering
its antithesis, namely, case or controversy.
The basic elements of the meaning of case and controversy
given in Muskrat v. United States are as follows:
By cases and controversies are intended the claims of liti-
gants brought before the courts for determination by such
regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for
the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the claim of a
party under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States takes such a form that the judicial power is capable
of acting upon it, then it had become a case. The term
implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties,
whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudica-
tion.10
This definition of case and controversy includes the require-
ments that the court have subject-matter jurisdiction," that
8. Some states provide otherwise for their courts. See Note, Advisory Opinions
on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (1956).
9. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352 (1911) (quoting Chief Justice
Jay).
10. Id. at 357 (quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 255 (N.D. Cal.
1887)).
11. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982). Moreover, courts have an independent duty to examine their jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Maier v. EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1036 (10th Cir. 1997); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. United States Dept. of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.
1997); Missouri v. Cuffley, 112 F.3d 1332, 1334 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
There are cases in which, although the court did not have jurisdiction, neither
the parties nor the court raised the issue and the court rendered an opinion. See,
e.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) ("Three decisions of this Court ar-
guably have assumed, with little discussion, that the APA is an independent grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction .... However, an Act of Congress enacted since our grant
of certiorari in this case now persuades us that the better view is that the APA is
not to be interpreted as an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review
1998]
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the issue be justiciable, 2 that the plaintiff have standing to
raise the issue, 3 that the issue not be moot,'4 and that the
court have authority to enter an enforceable remedy. 5 If any
of these is absent, the pronouncement by a federal court would
be non-binding and hence advisory. 6
agency actions.").
12. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a
political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers .... Deciding
whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authori-
ty has been committed .... is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution.").
13. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997) ("One element of the case-
or-controversy requirement is that appellees, based on their complaint, must establish
that they have standing to sue."); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.
Ct. 1055, 1067 (1997) ('Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case or contro-
versy requirement."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[The
core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-con-
troversy requirement of Article HI ... . "). Standing is defined as follows:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in facte-an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.- Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of-the injury has to be "fairly trace[able) to the challenged ac-
tion of the defendant, and not th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as
opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a
favorable decision."
Id. at 560-61 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
14. See Arizonans for Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1069 n.22. Mootness has
been described as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite per-
sonal interest that must exist at the commencement of litigation (standing) must
continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Id. (quoting United States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)).
15. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 356.
16. In addition to these types of advisory opinions, it has been argued that a
court's decision that was to "be applied prospectively only" would not be a judicial
resolution of a case or controversy under Article I. See James B. Bean Distilling Co.
v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 546 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Jill E. Fish,
Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1056,
1076 (1997) ("To the extent that the formalist distinction between legislative and
judicial lawmaking powers depends on temporal limits on the lawmaking process,
separation of powers considerations can be used to argue that adjudication should be
exclusively retroactive.").
ADVISORY OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS
HI. FEDERAL COURTS CANNOT BE COMPELLED BY CONGRESS
TO RENDER ADVISORY OPINIONS
The attitude of the Supreme Court regarding attempts by
Congress to compel advisory opinions from federal courts can be
seen from three cases decided over an eighty-five year period.
These cases are Muskrat v. United States, 17 Aetna Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Haworth,8 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 9
The statute at issue in Muskrat is highly unusual in that it
contained an express provision purporting to give the Court of
Claims in the first instance, and the United States Supreme
Court on appeal, jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion.0
Under previous statutes of 1902, Congress had made allocations
of lands of the Cherokee Nation to individuals and groups de-
fined in the statute.2' In 1906, Congress enacted new legisla-
tion that changed this allotment.' The validity of the 1906 Act
was doubtful, and, in 1907, the following statute was enacted
as the means to resolve this uncertainty:
That William Brown and Levi B. Gritts, on their own be-
half and on behalf of all other Cherokee citizens, having
like interests in the property allotted under the Act of July
first, nineteen hundred and two,... and David Muskrat
and J. Henry Dick, on their own behalf, and on behalf of
all Cherokee citizens enrolled as such for allotment as of
September first, nineteen hundred and two, be, and they
are hereby, authorized and empowered to institute their
suits in the Court of Claims to determine the validity of
any Acts of Congress passed since the said act of July first,
nineteen hundred and two ....
When the appeal of a suit brought under the 1907 Act in the
Court of Claims reached the Supreme Court, the central issue
was whether these courts had jurisdiction to hear and decide
17. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
18. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
19. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
20. See Act of March 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1028 (1907).
21. See Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1375, 32 Stat. 716 (1902).
22. See Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137 (1906), amended by Act of
June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325 (1906).
23. Act of March 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1028 (1907).
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the cases. The Supreme Court proceeded to answer this ques-
tion by supporting an argument based on the separation of
powers. It quoted from and relied upon Chief Justice Jay's
analysis regarding a 1792 statute "[t]hat by the Constitution of
the United States, the government thereof is divided into three
distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of
each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on ei-
ther."' The Court then noted that the only power of the judi-
cial branch was to hear and decide cases and controversies.
Thus, if the suits were not cases or controversies, the 1907 Act
would be an unconstitutional attempt by the legislative branch
to assign non-judicial duties to the judicial branch.' After
adopting the definition of case and controversy given above,2
the Court found that the suit before it failed to qualify." It
summarized this failure as follows:
The whole purpose of the law is to determine the constitu-
tional validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not aris-
ing between parties concerning a property right necessarily
involved in the decision in question .... Such judgment
will not conclude private parties, when actual litigation
brings to the court the question of the constitutionality of
such legislation.'
The fundamental flaw in the attempt was that the plaintiffs
lacked standing. In the language of present day cases, the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated injury in fact that was concrete
and particularized and which could be redressed by the
Court.2
9
A landmark in congressional efforts to authorize federal
courts to give advisory opinions was the enactment of the Fed-
eral Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.30 That Act stated that
"[in cases of actual controversy the courts of the United States
24. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352 (1911) (quoting Hayburn's Case,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792)).
25. See id. at 362.
26. See supra text accompanying note 10.
27. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 363.
28. Id. at 361-62.
29. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
30. See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. 4 2201 (1994)).
774
ADVISORY OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS
shall have power.., to declare rights and other legal relations
of any interested party... and such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and be reviewable
as such."3' Whereas the previous legislative acts purporting to
authorize advisory opinions by federal courts were limited to
specific subjects, the Declaratory Judgment Act was a wholesale
grant of power regardless of subject matter.
When the constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act
was challenged, the Court was faced with conflicting interests.
Although the Act provided a form of relief that could be useful
to litigants, it could also be viewed as imposing non-judicial
duties on the courts. This clash was resolved in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Haworth.2 The issue on appeal was whether
the district court had jurisdiction over the suit under the Feder-
al Declaratory Judgment Act.' The plaintiff, Aetna, filed a
complaint in the United States district court that sought a
decree declaring that four policies it had issued to the defen-
dant were null and void, and that its obligations under a fifth
policy were limited to forty-five dollars upon the death of the
defendant.' The district court held that the complaint did not
31. Id. The act provides:
(1) In cases of actual controversy the courts of the United States
shall have power upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appropri-
ate pleadings to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested
party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be prayed, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and be reviewable as such.
(2) Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may
be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application shall be by
petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the applica-
tion be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require
any adverse party, whose rights have been adjudicated by the declara-
tion, to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
(3) When a declaration of right or the granting of further relief
based thereon shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by
a jury, such issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interroga-
tories, with proper instructions by the court, whether a general verdict be
required or not.
Id. at 955-56.
32. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
33. See id. at 236.
34. See id. at 238.
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set forth a "controversy" and thus dismissed the case. 5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal. 6
The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that
federal courts are limited to the exercise of judicial power only
in "cases" and "controversies." The Court, however, acknowl-
edged that Congress has constitutional authority to enact new
procedures for presenting cases and controversies and to pro-
vide new remedies that can be awarded in cases and controver-
sies. 7 Thus, if the Declaratory Judgment Act was an attempt
to require advisory opinions, it would be unconstitutional. If the
Act only provided new procedures or remedies in actual cases
or controversies, it would be constitutional. The resolution of
these conflicting possibilities was made by reliance on the
words of the statute itself. Since Congress had limited the
Declaratory Judgment Act to "cases or actual controversies," the
Court held that the Act was "procedural only," and thus consti-
tutional."
It is instructive to see how the Supreme Court resolved the
issue before it in Aetna. The Court found three determining
factors: a dispute relating to legal rights and obligations arising
out of contracts of insurance, that the dispute was definite and
concrete, and that it called for an adjudication of present
rights.39 It was irrelevant that the adjudication of rights did
not require "the award of process or the payment of damag-
es ... [or] an injunction."" The judicial power of federal
courts was determined by the facts regarding the claim, not
whether a traditional remedy was being sought.41
The balancing process applied in Aetna of steering clear of an
advisory opinion while recognizing the lawful procedures and
35. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 11 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D. Mo. 1935).
36. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 84 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1936).
37. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 277, 240 (1937).
38. Id.; see also Franchise Tax Bd. v Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1983) (holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act is a procedural stat-
ute, not a jurisdictional statute).
39. See Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240-41.
40. Id. at 241.
41. See id. at 240.
776 [Vol. 32:769
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remedies Congress created in the Declaratory Judgment Act has
been characterized in a later opinion as follows:
[T]he federal courts established pursuant to Article III of
the Constitution do not render advisory opinions. For adju-
dication of constitutional issues "concrete legal issues, pre-
sented in actual cases, not abstractions" are requisite. This
is as true of declaratory judgments as any other field.42
The difference between an abstract question and a "contro-
versy" contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is
necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it
would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining
in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically,
the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, un-
der all the circumstances, show that there is substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests,
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment.'
The end result of the Court's opinions interpreting and apply-
ing the Declaratory Judgment Act is that the Court gave itself
the best of two worlds. It has held that the Act created a much
needed procedure and remedy, and the Court has retained for
federal courts alone the power to say when an action seeking to
use the new procedure and remedy crossed the line separating
advisory opinions from cases and controversies. The position
that has evolved is 'clear affirmation that the Court will not
allow the other branches of government to impose on the feder-
al judiciary the non-judicial duty of rendering advisory opinions.
That the Court's approach under the Declaratory Judgment
Act of retaining ultimate authority to decide when a complaint
crosses the line separating cases and controversies from adviso-
ry opinions is also the law regarding other statutory attempts
to force advisory opinions can be seen in its interpretation of
citizen-suit provisions in the False Claims Act,' and in recent
42. Golden v. Zwiclder, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (quoting United Public Workers
of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (alteration in original)).
43. Id. (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941)).
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(eX4XA) (1994). For cases upholding the standing of qui tam
plaintiffs under this act, see United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General
Electric Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994) and United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing
Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court did not address this issue in Hughes Air-
1998] 777
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environmental laws.45 These latter statutory attempts to create
authority in all citizens to act as "private attorneys general" to
enforce the environmental laws are based on the qui tam sec-
tion of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899.'
The common law doctrine codified in the Rivers and Harbors
Act allows citizens to prosecute crimes and keep half of the
fines imposed.47
Encouraged by the success under the Rivers and Harbors Act,
Congress went beyond the criminal qui tam actions and at-
tempted to create broader civil authority in all citizens to bring
suit for violations of the various environmental statutes. Typical
of the citizen-suit provisions is that of the Endangered Species
Act which states that "any person may commence a civil suit on
his own behalf.., to enjoin any person, including the United
States and any other government instrumentality or agen-
cy, .. . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter."' A literal interpretation of this subsection would
give anyone the right to sue if a federal agency or any person
failed to comply with any provision of the Act. This would rep-
resent a dramatic broadening of the meaning of standing, and
hence the meaning of case and controversy, with a correspond-
ing narrowing of the class of advisory opinions. Predictably, the
Supreme Court rejected this literal reading and thereby protect-
ed its authority to decide when a suit is seeking an advisory
craft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997).
45. See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994);
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994); Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9654 (1994); Emergency Plinning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §
11046 (1994).
46. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1994). For a discussion of the scope of this Act,
see United States u. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) and United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). For a discussion of the evolution of qui
tam actions under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, see Robert L. Potter, Com-
ment, Discharging New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis of the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 483, 509 (1972) (arguing that the broad
language used by Justice Douglas in United States v. Standard Oil Co. was merely
dictum). If that is the case, this is an example of advisory dicta shaping the entire
field of water law, or perhaps all of environmental law.
47. See 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1994).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
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opinion. This narrowing occurred in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life.49 In that case, the Court was confronted with the holding
of the Ninth Circuit that the Endangered Species Act created
procedural rights which, if breached by the Secretary, could be
enforced by anyone. In rejecting this interpretation the Court
stated:
The question presented here is whether the public interest
in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in
agencies' observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed
procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a
statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all
citizens... to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has
the separation-of-powers significance we have always said,
the answer must be obvious . ... '
The Lujan opinion continues the law as stated in Muskrat
and Haworth. The federal courts will tolerate no wholesale or
fact-specific determination by Congress as to when the line
separating cases and controversies from advisory opinions is
crossed. It is for the federal courts, and them alone, to make
these decisions.
The three decisions discussed above, which deal specifically
with Congress' attempts to create in federal courts the power to
issue advisory opinions, fit squarely within general constitution-
al principles developed by the Court regarding the limits on
Congress to interpret the Constitution. The most recent case
limiting Congress' power is City of Boerne v. Flores,51 in which
the Court held that Congress does not have the authority to
enact legislation that purports only to interpret a substantive
constitutional provision, but which, in fact, makes changes to
the provision.52 Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha53 addressed the issue of the power of Congress to en-
act laws establishing lawmaking procedures different from those
specified in the Constitution and held that Congress has no
49. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
50. Id. at 576-77.
51. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
52. See id. at 2160.
53. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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such power.' Given the long-standing attitude of the Court
regarding Congress' authority to require advisory opinions and
the consistency of that position with the Court's jurisprudence
on Congress' authority to alter substantive or procedural consti-
tutional standards, it is unlikely that the Court will reverse its
position on this issue.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS CANNOT BE COMPELLED BY PARTIES TO
RENDER ADVISORY OPINIONS
Pressure on federal courts to render advisory opinions also
comes from sources other than Congress. Litigants, aware that
the line separating cases and controversies from advisory opin-
ions is not well defined, have pressed suits that fall in the grey
zone. When a federal court has an interest in establishing law
in an area pressed by a litigant, it may draw the line to in-
clude the suit as a controversy. An example of this process is
found in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 5 If, how-
ever, the cautionary instincts of the federal judiciary prevail,
the line will be drawn to exclude the case. Arizonans for Offi-
cial English6 illustrates this cautionary approach by the Su-
preme Court, in contrast to the press of the en banc Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to reach the merits in this
case.5" These decisions and others are discussed below to dem-
onstrate the general principle that litigants cannot, through
stipulation or collusion, compel a federal court to render an
opinion. Litigants may, however, be able to offer a federal court
the opportunity to develop law when it is so inclined.
If parties to a suit in a federal court were permitted to stipu-
late the facts and the law that should be applied to them, they
would have a method to present hypothetical questions to the
court and obtain advisory opinions. To prevent this, the Court
has held that stipulations of law do not bind federal courts."
54. See id. at 959.
55. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
56. 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
57. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 69 F.3d 920, 1084 (9th Cir. 1995).
58. See United States Nat Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents, 508 U.S.
439, 446-47 (1993) ("[Plermitt[ing] litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue presented,
to extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitu-
780
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Yet, federal courts use a device that amounts to virtual stipula-
tion of the law: "assuming without deciding" what the law is. A
recent example of this practice is the en banc decision in
Shahar v. Bower.59 By using this device, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit avoided deciding
whether a lesbian, whose offer of employment with the state of
Georgia was withdrawn, had a constitutionally protected federal
right to be "married" to another woman. ° The constitutional
rights implicated were the First Amendment right to intimate
association and the right to expressive association.6' The ma-
jority assumed "for argument's sake" that plaintiff Shahar had
these rights regarding her "marriage" to another woman.62
Based on this assumption, the majority held that the proper
constitutional standard would be the Pickering balancing
test.' Yet, because the majority proceeded on a hypothetical
path, it was reduced to giving arguments about weighing "x"
against "y," rather than putting real facts and policies in the
balance pans.' In a concurring opinion sharply criticizing this
approach, Judge Tjoflat stated that "the court must describe
qualitatively the constitutional right it is placing on the scale in
order to determine whether, on balance, the government's inter-
est is to prevail." By using the "assuming without deciding"
device, the majority was able to render, at its election, an advi-
sory opinion.
tional principles . . . would be difficult to characterize as anything but advisory."); see
also Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (rejecting the position taken by
both parties in the suit that the Tax Court is not a "court" as that term is used in a
statute at issue in the case).
59. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
60. As the rationale for using the "assuming without deciding" technique in con-
stitutional cases such as Shahar the court stated: "a] fundamental and longstanding
principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional ques-
tions in advance of the necessity of deciding them." Id. at 1100 (quoting Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 673-74 (1988)). It is ques-
tionable, however, whether this principle is applicable to Shahar since the tack the
majority used also required a constitutional determination; that is, the majority mere-
ly substituted one constitutional question for another.
61. See id. at 1102.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1103. The outcome of the Pickering balancing test is a question of
law. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
64. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106.
65. Id. at 1112 (TIjoflat, J., concurring).
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In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," the discretion
the Court had in deciding whether to render what amounts to
an advisory opinion was its general power to decide cases that
turn on an erroneous finding of fact by the trial court.7 In
this case, the "fact" in question was that two building lots on
the Isle of Palms, South Carolina, purchased in 1986 for
$975,000, were now valueless because of a state regulation that
prevented their use for residential construction.' The disposi-
tion of the case by the state supreme court, however, made the
status of that "fact" unclear. As Justice Blackmun pointed out
in his dissent, "[r]espondent contested the findings of fact of the
trial court in the South Carolina Supreme Court, but that court
did not resolve the issue."" In Lucas, the Court, acting within
its discretion, seized the opportunity to assume that the value
was zero and make law regarding regulatory taking.70 It did so
at its election, however, not through compulsion by the par-
ties.7
1
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Arizonans for Official English
demonstrates that federal courts do not merely evaluate the
legal and factual arguments of the parties when it determines
on which side of the line separating cases and controversies
from advisory opinions a pending suit falls.72 It also illustrates
how a court's interest in reaching the merits of suit may cause
it to interpret procedures normatively to enable it to reach the
merits of the case.73 In an effort to keep this suit alive, the
majority refused to give weight to an opinion by the state At-
torney General that would have mooted it, refused to refer it to
the state supreme court for a definitive interpretation of the
state initiative at issue, refused to stay its proceedings while
the state supreme court decided a parallel case, and refused to
66. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
67. See id. at 1045 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I agree . .. that [the Court] has
the power to decide a case that turns on an erroneous finding, but I question the
wisdom of deciding an issue based on a factual premise that does not exist in this
case, and in the judgment of the Court will exist in the future only in "extraordinary
circumstance[s] . . ").
68. See id. at 1007.
69. Id. at 1044 n.6.
70. See id. at 1010-14.
71. See id.
72. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1065-66 (1997).
73. See id. at 1059-60, 1065-66.
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moot the case when the only plaintiff, Yniguez, resigned from
her position with the state.74
Instead of following the general principle of avoiding unneces-
sary constitutional adjudication, the majority of the Ninth Cir-
cuit introduced a theory of nominal damages to create standing
after the only plaintiff had resigned from her position with the
state and, effectively, from the case.75 This enabled the court
to rule on the constitutionality of the state initiative.7" The Su-
preme Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for losing sight of the
limitations placed on federal courts; namely, that "[f]ederal
courts lack competence to rule definitively on the meaning of
state legislation, nor may they adjudicate challenges to state
measures absent a showing of actual impact on the challeng-
er."77 Regarding the introduction of the nominal damages theo-
ry in an attempt to keep the case alive, the Court stated: "In
advancing cooperation between Yniguez and the Attorney Gen-
eral regarding the request for an agreement to pay nominal
damages, the Ninth Circuit did not home in on the federal
courts' lack of authority to act in friendly or feigned proceed-
ings. " 8 Instead, in a press to make constitutional law in a
high-profile case, the Ninth Circuit majority gave too little
consideration to the fundamental constitutional restraints on its
judicial power. 9
In summary, the cases discussed in this Part demonstrate
that federal courts deny parties to suits the power to determine
conclusively on which side of the line separating cases and
controversies from advisory opinions their suit falls. The courts
themselves, however, retain a great deal of discretion in making
that call.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1067.
76. See id. at 1066-67.
77. Id. at 1059 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 1070.
79. See id. at 1059.
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V. FEDERAL COURTS MAY ELECT TO PROVIDE
ADVISORY OPINIONS
The binding or precedential force of federal courts' opinions is
limited to those conclusions that are necessary to support the
decisions."s Any other statement made in opinions is obiter
dictum81 or dictum for short. It is incorrect to think, however,
that dicta have no force at all. In reality, the weight given to
dicta ranges on an inexact, non-linear scale from rejection, to
indifference, to persuasion, to deference, to compulsion. Where
particular dicta fall on this scale for a court that is faced with
it depends on many factors, most of which are unknowable.
Among the controlling factors for such a court may be the level
of the court giving the dicta, reaction of other courts to the
dicta, quality of the analysis supporting the dicta, the age of
the dicta, and the closeness of the fit of the dicta to the case
under consideration.
If a court includes dicta in an opinion deciding an actual
controversy, it is going beyond its jurisdiction in the case and
rendering advice on the law.82 The statements that are not
necessary to support the decision amount to an advisory opinion
contained within the resolution of a case or controversy.
80. See United States Natl Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents, 508 U.S.
439, 463 n.11 (1993) ("[Olur remark in Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497,
502 (1936), that the 1916 Act "amends [sections of the Federal Reserve Act]" . . . is
obviously not controlling, coming as it did in an opinion that did not present the
question we decide in these cases .... [Cases such as Posadas] contain a valuable
reminder about the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta.").
81. Dictum is defined as
an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion
upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or
the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessar-
ily involved in the case or essential to its determination; any statement
of the law enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argu-
ment, analogy, or suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion
concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved
nor essential to determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and
lack the force of an adjudication.
BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990).
82. See, e.g., Recupero v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 828 (1st
Cir. 1997) ("A central characteristic of federal jurisdiction is that it tends to be claim-
based, and thus specific to claims, rather than case-based, and thus general to an
entire case if the court has jurisdiction over any claim.").
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Dicta that are given little or no precedential weight are of no
concern; they are judicial advice that has no practical signifi-
cance. However, dicta that are perceived as binding or virtually
binding have become judicial advisory opinions and reflect a de
facto or virtual jurisdiction in Article JII courts to issue such
opinions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit explicitly acknowledged this de facto jurisdiction by
stating that "this court considers itself bound by Supreme Court
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright hold-ings . .. ."83
A. Harm Caused by Judicial Advice
Use of the de facto jurisdiction to render advisory opinions
creates two types of problems in the federal judiciary. First,
since the application of advisory precedent is wholly dependent
on the willing acceptance by other courts, such precedence can
be rejected at any time by any court. This introduces instability
and uncertainty in law, both of which are undesirable. In Payne
v. Tennessee," the Court stated that "[s]tare decisis is the pre-
ferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance
on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and per-
ceived integrity of the judicial process."85 Advisory dicta lack
these desirable qualities underlying stare decisis, and thus
weaken the judicial process. A leading example of the use of de
facto jurisdiction, the constitutionality of public universities
using race in their admission programs, is discussed below. The
second problem created by the use of de facto jurisdiction is
that the application of advisory precedent may not be uniform
since it is based on subjective attitudes of various judges. This
can lead to splits among the circuits and splits at the district
83. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Pittsburg &
Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540 n.10 (10th Cir. 1995)).
84. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
85. Id. at 827. The Court also quotes Justice Brandeis stating that adhering to
precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." Id.; see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("Indeed, the very concept of
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time
that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.").
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court level within a circuit. Examples of this problematic devel-
opment also are discussed below.
The instability created when a court gives an advisory opin-
ion in dicta is illustrated in Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke.8 In this case, Bakke, a white male, challenged
an admission rule of the University of California at Davis that
reserved sixteen of 100 admission slots to its medical school for
"minority groups" or groups designated as "economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged."87 He claimed this rule, which
excluded him from consideration for appointment to the sixteen
slots, violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Justices
Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger held
that the rule violated Title VI, and that it was therefore un-
necessary to consider Bakke's constitutional claim.89 Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun rejected the Title VI
argument and held that under the Fourteenth Amendment the
intermediate scrutiny standard was applicable to this case."
Applying this standard, they upheld the university's rule.9'
The ninth vote was that of Justice Powell who rejected the
rationales given by both of the four-member blocks. He conclud-
ed that it was necessary to reach the constitutional issue, but
that the proper standard was strict scrutiny.92 - Under this
standard, Justice Powell concluded that the university's purpose
of a racially diverse student body was a compelling interest, but
the university had failed to make the necessary showing that
its rule was the least restrictive means of accomplishing its
purpose.9" Justice Powell's vote that the university's decision
not to consider Bakke for all medical school slots violated the
Equal Protection Clause, when added to the Stevens-Stewart-
Rehnquist-Burger block, yielded a majority to that effect. His
rejection of the California Supreme Court's holding that the
University was prohibited from using race in admission deci-
86. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
87. Id. at 274.
88. See id. at 266; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
89. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412, 418.
90. See id. at 361-62.
91. See id. at 379.
92. See id. at 289-91.
93. See id. at 320.
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sions combined with that of the other four-Justice block to yield
the majority holding on that point. Justice Powell, however,
included an extensive discussion of the use of the race of appli-
cants as one factor in making admission decisions. No other
Justice joined his position that such use of race would be con-
stitutional.9' It was dicta by a single Justice. Yet, Justice
Powell's dictum appears to have become the de facto law of the
land to schools on the question of admission programs, which
have broadly accepted the use of race as a "plus."95
This acceptance of Justice Powell's dicta rests on a willing-
ness of the institutions to follow it, not on its binding force.
When the Court, in other cases, reached conclusions that reject-
ed the use of race by governments except as remedial measures
and questioned whether Bakke was binding precedent,"6 this
willingness was questioned and rejected. This occurred in
Hopwood v. Texas,97 where the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was faced with admissions rules under
which applications of Blacks and Mexicans to the University of
Texas Law School were given favorable treatment. The justifica-
tion offered by the University of Texas was that this practice
increased diversity in the student body." The status of Bakke
as precedent for this rationale was presented in starkest terms:
"The law school maintains ... that Justice Powell's formulation
94. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2581 (1996) ("Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has
never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case.").
This was at least implicitly acknowledged by the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2109 (1995) ("The Court's failure to produce a majority
opinion in Bakke ... left unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race-based gov-
ernmental action.).
95. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: a Constitutional Analysis, 67 CAL L. REV. 69
(1979) (Justice Powell's "tiebreaking opinion... has acquired wide programmatic
appeal.); see also Jones ex rel. Michele v. Board of Educ., 632 F. Supp 1319, 1324
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (accepting the Board's position that coeducation better prepares stu-
dents and relying on Bakke as precedent); Phelps v. Washburn Univ., 634 F. Supp.
556, 566 (D. Kan. 1986) (stating that the "Washburn plan is substantially similar to
the Harvard College admission process, which was approved by the Supreme Court in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke"). The same type of plan for teachers
was at issue in United States v. Board of Education of Piscataway, 832 F. Supp. 836
(D.N.J. 1993), 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506
(1997).
96. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2109 (1995).
97. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
98. See id. at 944.
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in Bakke is law and must be followed-at least in the context
of higher education."99 The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected this
position. It stated: "Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not bind-
ing precedent on this issue. While he announced the judgment,
no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing
the diversity rationale."00 Having freed itself from Justice
Powell's conclusion that diversity in state universities is a com-
pelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth
Circuit held, in language a concurring judge thought over-
broad,' that "the use of race to achieve a diverse student
body... simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough
to meet the steep standard of strict scrutiny."102
The holding in Hopwood... undermined all of the affirma-
tive action programs at public colleges and universities in the
Fifth Circuit that had relied on Justice Powell's dicta as though
it were binding precedent. A dramatic shift in this area of the
law was perceived as having occurred, and the predictability of
the law was dealt a severe blow. Public colleges and universi-
ties in other circuits are left wondering about the legality of
their affirmative action programs that relied on Justice Powell's
speculation.' °
A second example illustrating the house-of-cards nature of
law based on an advisory opinion, even one by the Supreme
Court, is Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Greenwich Collieries. 5 The advisory opinion at issue was dic-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 963.
102. Id. at 948.
103. It is ironic that the Fifth Circuit, after rejecting Justice Powelrs view as
dicta, introduced dicta of its own when it stated that "[aln admissions process may
also consider an applicant's ... relationship to school alumni." Id. at 946. For an
analysis questioning this dicta see Note, Hopwood v. Texas, 110 HARV. L. REV. 775,
780 (1997).
104. This uncertainty may have been resolved if the Court had decided on appeal
Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
2506 (1997). Although this case dealt with employment of teachers rather than an
admissions program, the Court could have used the case to address the broader issue
of the use of race in a non-remedial case. The parties, however, settled the case be-
fore the Court could hear it.
105. 512 U.S. 267 (1994), affg 990 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Rachel
Courtney, Note, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich
Collieries: The Reasons for and Ramifications of Eliminating -True Doubt," 49 ADMIN.
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ta in a footnote in NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp.'" that interpreted section 7(c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of
proof."1 7 In Transportation Management Corp., the Court stat-
ed that this provision determines only the burden of going for-
ward, not the burden of persuasion.' At issue in Greenwich
Collieries was a rule called the "true doubt rule""° under the
Black Lung Benefits Act,"0 which was consistent with the
Court's interpretation in Transportation Management Corp. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held
the true doubt rule to be inconsistent with section 7(c) of the
APA, and therefore invalid."' Thus, the Court in Greenwich
Collieries was reviewing a decision that had rejected its posi-
tion. In affirming the Third Circuit's holding and explaining its
apparent shift, the Court stated:
[W]e do not think our cursory conclusion in the Transporta-
tion Management footnote withstands scrutiny .... [Its]
cursory answer to an ancillary and largely unbriefed ques-
tion does not warrant the same level of deference we typi-
cally give our precedents."
While the Court's evaluation in Greenwich Collieries of the
precedential value of the footnote is correct, it is also incom-
plete since it does not explain what deference should be given
to such advisory statements of the Court. That is the inherent
problem with advice in opinions that go beyond the controversy.
An explanation of the precedental value of such advice would
prove extremely useful since courts, including the Supreme
L. REv. 223 (1997).
106. 462 U.S. 393, 403 n.7 (1983).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994).
108. See Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 403 n.7.
109. See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Program, 988 F.2d 706, 709-10 (7th Cir. 1993) (The "true doubt rule" is de-
rived from S. Rep. No. 92-743 (1972), in which Congress noted that the Black Lung
Benefits Act was intended to be remedial. Thus, indefinite medical conclusions should
be resolved in favor of the miner or his survivor.).
110. 30 U.S.C. §§ 931-945 (1994).
111. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collier-
ies, 512 U.S. 267, 270 (1994).
112. Id. at 277.
1998] " 789
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Court, continue to include it in footnotes and elsewhere in their
opinions. For example, in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,"'
referring to the relationship between two sections of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabili-
ty Act ("CERCLA")" 4 that appear to provide recovery alterna-
tives for parties potentially responsible for remediation cost, the
Court stated that CERCLA "expressly authorizes a cause of
action for contribution in section 113 and impliedly authorizes a
similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in section 107.""'
The existence of two separate remedies, however, is a hotly
contested issue that has split the circuits"6 and will no doubt
land at the Supreme Court which will be faced then with its
own words.
One last example of the instability and uncertainty created
by advisory statements in opinions comes from Ross v.
Bernhard."7 In Ross, the Court in a footnote gave a three-
prong test regarding the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial." The third prong states that the "legal" nature (as op-
posed to the "equitable" nature) of the issue "is determined
by ... the practical abilities and limitations of juries.""9
Whether the Court meant this third prong to be a holding or
dicta is unclear. When considering this question, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated, "We also
find it unlikely that the Supreme Court would have announced
an important new application of the seventh amendment in so
cursory a fashion,"2 ° This possible exception to a right to a
jury trial led almost immediately to contradictory lower court
decisions.' 2' There continues to be a split in the circuits re-
garding whether the third prong is the law. It has been recog-
nized as law by the Third Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic
Products Antitrust Litigation,1" but rejected by the Ninth Cir-
113. 511 U.s. 809 (1994).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
115. Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 816.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 157-66.
117. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
118. See id. at 538 n.10.
119. Id.
120. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080 (3rd Cir.
1980).
121. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1979).
122. 631 F.2d 1069, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1980).
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cuit in In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation." Thus, the
Court by its advisory language in a footnote has fueled, rather
than resolved, a split in the circuits.
B. Benefits of Judicial Advice
Courts' practice of including advice that goes beyond the
actual controversies being decided does have some benefits. As
the discussion below will show, the advisory statements can
enrich the opinion and help it achieve the desirable objectives
of being understandable, useful, and persuasive. The discussion
will present examples of dicta being used to accomplish these
goals.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,' the Court
stated that if a governmental regulation that eliminated all
economically valuable use of a person's property was merely the
assertion of a "permanent easement that was a pre-existing
limitation upon the landowner's title," it would be upheld.'
To explain its position and to indicate what may be included in
the meaning of the terms it had used, the Court resorted to
dicta in the form of examples and advice. It stated:
[T]he owner of a lake bed... would not be entitled to
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect
of flooding others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nu-
clear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all
improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant
sits astride an earthquake fault. Such regulatory action...
does not proscribe a productive use that was previously
permissible under relevant property and nuisance
principles.'
These examples make the bare legal rule announced earlier in
the opinion more understandable and will provide guidance to
lower courts as they attempt to apply it.
123. 609 F.2d 411, 430 (9th Cir. 1979).
124. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
125. Id. at 1028-29.
126. Id. at 1029-30.
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Advice in opinions can also be used by a court to mark a
boundary for a legal doctrine 12 or even bracket it, that is,
provide upper and lower limits for the doctrine. An example of
bracketing is given in United States v. Winstar Corp.,"2 where
the Court was called upon to define the "unmistakability doc-
trine," which determines when a government has, by contract,
waived certain sovereign rights. By the following examples, the
Court bracketed the contractual claims that enclose the ulti-
mate resolution of this issue:
At one end of the wide spectrum are claims for the enforce-
ment of contractual obligations that could not be recognized
without effectively limiting sovereign authority, such as a
claim for a rebate under an agreement for a tax exemption.
Granting a rebate, like enjoining enforcement, would simply
block the exercise of the taxing power, and the
unmistakability doctrine would have to be satisfied. At the
other end are contracts, say, to buy food for the army; no
sovereign power is limited by the Government's promise to
purchase and a claim for damages implies no such limita-
tion. That is why no one would seriously contend that en-
forcement of humdrum supply contracts might be subject to
the unmistakability doctrine.'
Starting from these boundaries, Justice Souter, for the plurali-
ty, was able to conclude that the doctrine did not apply to the
case before the Court.
Advisory dicta can serve as counter-examples to refute posi-
tions taken by parties. Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,"' used this device to demon-
strate the untenability of the plaintiffs' "animal nexus" and
"vocational nexus" arguments to establish their standing. He
stated:
127. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987) ("[A] grant of
federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of Congress' broad
spending power.").
128. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
129. Id. at 2457 (citation and footnote omitted).
130. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian ele-
phants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of
Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue be-
cause the Director of The Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) did not consult with the Secretary regarding the
AID-funded project in Sri Lanka."
With the aid of these examples of his own creation, Justice
Scalia quite convincingly could conclude: "This is beyond all
reason."
3 2
This use of dicta also surfaced in Wittmer v. Peters,13
where the court was faced with plaintiffs' position that "the
only form of racial discrimination that can survive strict scruti-
ny is discrimination designed to cure the ill effects of past dis-
crimination by the public institution that is asking to be al-
lowed to try this dangerous cure."" Wittmer involved a claim
by white correctional officers alleging that they were not select-
ed for a lieutenant's position because of their race. Chief Judge
Posner characterized the authority cited in support of the
plaintiffs' argument as dicta.'35 To refute the plaintiffs' argu-
ment, he relied at least partially on a counter-example created
by the court:
At argument the plaintiffs' counsel conceded, in response to
a question from the bench, that separation of the races in a
prison that was undergoing a race riot would not violate
the Constitution. That is a clearer case for discrimination
than this, but our point is only that the rectification of past
discrimination is not the only setting in which government
officials can lawfully take race into account in making deci-
sions.'
Chief Judge Posner, having justified dismissing precedent by
characterizing it as dicta, thereby created dicta himself to sup-
port his contrary position."'
131. Id. at 566.
132. Id.
133. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997).
134. Id. at 919 (emphasis in original).
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. For a case in which the Court uses a counter example to refute a party's
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Even if the counter-example in the advisory dicta fails to
rebut an argument, it may focus and sharpen the debate among
the Justices. This occurred in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon"s with Justice Scalia's exam-
ple of a "farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that
makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes oxygen and
thereby 'impairs [the] breeding' of protected fish"'39 who would
be held to have "harmed" an endangered species under The En-
dangered Species Act.' This example is cited by Justice
O'Connor and helps give context to her concurrence in which
she joins the majority only with the understanding that
proximate causation is a requirement in the meaning of "harm"
under the Act and its implementing regulations.'
In addition to the possible value of advisory dicta to the
decision itself, often dicta indicate the path law may take in
the future. For example, in Babbitt, the Court pointed to a
footnote in TVA v. Hill, an earlier Endangered Species Act
decision, which, although not relevant to Hill, foreshadowed the
holding in Babbitt." The Court is implying that clearly the
parties should have understood from that footnote the direction
of the law regarding the meaning of "take" under the Endan-
gered Species Act. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Geor-
position, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Bowsher was a case involving
the independence of the Comptroller General, who could be removed only for perma-
nent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or conviction of certain
crimes. Reviewing this issue, the Court stated: "Surely no one would seriously suggest
that judicial independence would be strengthened by allowing removal of federal judg-
es only by a joint resolution finding 'inefficiency,' 'neglect of duty,' or 'malfeasance."
Id. at 730. For an interesting insight into why this opinion includes other dicta, see
id. at 725 n.4; see also Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia
and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1995).
138. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
139. Id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
141. See Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Court in Hill explained that
[t]he Secretary of the Interior has defined the term "harm" to mean "an
act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts
which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential
behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feed-
ing or sheltering;, significant environmental modification or degradation
which has such effects is included within the meaning of 'harm.'
Id. at 184-85 n.30 (emphasis in original).
143. See Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 699 n.12.
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ga,1 4 Justice White, in a concurring opinion, detected a not-
so-subtle hint in the majority opinion for a possible change in
direction on the prospective operation of judicial opinions:
I do not understand how Justice SOUTER can cite the
cases on prospective operation, and yet say that he need not
speculate as to the propriety of pure prospectivity. The
propriety of prospective application of decision in this
Court... is settled by our prior decisions. To nevertheless
"speculate" about the issue is only to suggest that there
may come a time when our precedents on the issue will be
overturned.1"
These signposts of the courts can be used by legislatures as
well as courts to avoid problems. In the murky world of the use
of governmental subsidies to attract or retain industries, the
rules that separate legal assistance from illegal discrimination
are complex. When the Maine legislature was faced with
drafting a law to assist local dairies, it turned to advice from
the Supreme Court in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,'
which included in dicta a test that the Court suggested could
be used to differentiate between the two. Its law based on this
suggestion was upheld when challenged.'47
VI. ON BALANCE
Federal courts have successfully resisted attempts by Con-
gress and parties to impose on them an obligation to render
advisory opinions. At the same time, they have retained the
authority to weigh competing interests in particular cases and
144. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
145. Id. at 546 (White, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.9 (1980) (Although the case involved only do-
mestic commerce, the Court nevertheless stated: "We note, however, that Commerce
Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is
alleged.").
146. 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) (stating that "it is undisputed that States may
try to attract business by creating an environment conducive to economic activity").
147. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Mahany, 943 F. Supp. 83, 90 (D. Me. 1996),
vacated and remanded, 116 F.3d 943 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Note, Functional Analy-
sis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1537, 1553
(1997) (discussing the Cumberland Farms decision).
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decide when, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a declara-
tion of rights would be an advisory opinion and when it would
not. They also retain the sole right to decide when including
advisory dicta that go beyond the actual controversy being adju-
dicated is proper. The rules regarding advisory opinions, howev-
er, do not necessarily indicate a judiciary that is hostile to
giving advice. For example, federal courts routinely hold that
the Declaratory Judgment Act' is to be construed liberal-
ly, 149 and declaratory judgments have long been an integral
part of federal procedure. 5 °
Although there are no data, it is certainly not unusual to
find hypothetical examples and other advisory dicta in opinions
of appellate courts and in the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of district courts. Often these advisory statements provide
texture and meaning to the decision and indicate the general
direction a legal doctrine may take in the future. Advisory dicta
can also be useful to other courts who find themselves in un-
charted waters. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit stated, "We hesitate to ignore judicial pronounce-
ments too readily as mere dicta, however, for we must find
guidance somewhere in the parties' proffered authorities."''
The key word here is "guidance." Dicta can suggest a path and
provide reinforcement if the court goes down that path.'52
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1994).
149. See Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., 588 F.2d 895, 900 (3rd Cir. 1978); Beacon Const.
Co. v. Matco Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Employ-
ers Liab. Assurance Corp., 445 F.2d 1278, 1280 (5th Cir. 1971).
150. See Developments in the Law, Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HARV. L
REv. 787, 787 (1949) ("The past thirty years have seen the declaratory judgment
develop into an integral part of the American scheme of judicial remedies.").
151. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1997),
cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997); see also Capital Dev. Co. v. Port of Astoria, 109
F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1997); Henkin v. Northrop Corp., 921 F.2d 864 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating that "[d]icta from the highest court in the state, while not controlling,
is relevant to this inquiry [of determining state law]").
152. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 118 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (stating "even though some aspects of the analysis may be characterized as
dictum rather than holding, it is appropriate to follow and apply the stated princi-
ples .... Courts frequently and properly cite and rely upon dicta that correctly set
forth governing or relevant legal principles"); Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union,
Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 850 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[Tlwo recent cases . . . note, albeit in dicta,
that employers must not be compelled to reinstate personnel who violate the terms of
a comprehensive drug-free workplace program.").
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It would be helpful to lower courts and litigants if the Court
made a clear statement regarding how it expects lower courts
to treat advisory dicta in its opinions. A weak version of what
is needed was made in United States National Bank of Oregon
v. Independent Insurance Agents,'" where, in a footnote re-
sponding to the argument that the case under consideration
was controlled by two of its previous holdings, the Court stated
"[n]either case tells us anything helpful for resolving this one,
though together they contain a valuable reminder about the
need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta."'"
The Court had the opportunity to provide guidance on the
weight it expects lower courts to give to its dicta in Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collier-
ies,'" where it reviewed a decision from the Third Circuit that
had rejected earlier Supreme Court dicta. If the Court had
noted this fact and had indicated its approval of the indepen-
dence of the Third Circuit, it would have signaled other courts
to be more objective when faced with similar situations. This
would lessen the practice of courts "consider[ing] [themselves]
bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the
Court's outright holding."5 '
In all likelihood, the Court will have another opportunity to
make such a statement in an appeal to resolve the split in the
circuits over the relationship between sections 107 and 113 of
CERCLA"5 In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States," the
issue was whether a person liable under CERCLA could recover
attorney fees as a "necessary cost of response" under section
107.' However, the Court in dicta regarding the relationship
of sections 107 and 113 stated that CERCLA "expressly autho-
153. 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
154. Id. at 463 n.11.
155. 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
156. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1830 (1996).
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f)(1). Under § 9607(a), categories of parties defined
in CERCLA may be held liable for '(A) all costs ... incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe ... [and] (B) any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person.. .. " Section 9613(f)(1) provides that "[a]ny
person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under section 9607(a) . . . .
158. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
159. Id. at 811.
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rizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly
authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in §
107."'" The circuits are split on the relationship between
these two sections of CERCLA. The Sixth Circuit has held that
persons liable under section 107 can seek recovery from other
persons under both sections 107 and 113.161 The courts of ap-
peals for the First,'62  Seventh,"a' Ninth,'" Tenth," and
Eleventh" Circuits have held that a person liable under sec-
tion 107 can only seek contribution under section 113. Thus, all
the pieces are in place for a decision by the Supreme Court in
which it would be confronted with its own dicta on this issue. If
the Court decides to grant certiorari in one of these cases and
resolve this split, it would be a great service to lower courts
and litigants if it spoke out on the issue of the use of dicta.
160. Id. at 816.
161. See Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 528-30 (6th Cir. 1993).
162. See United Tech. Corp. v. Brown-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
163. See Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
164. See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir.
1997).
165. See United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1995).
166. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir.
1996).
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